VI

American Mass Media and Stalinism, 1941-1947, or, Where Do People Really Get Their Ideas?*

> The study of history rather means to scrutinize the statements made by all writers of a certain period in order to obtain a fair idea of how the events of that time have possibly taken place.—Rabbi Solomon Schindler, "The Study of History in the Public Schools," *The Arena* (December, 1889), p. 47.

> Little consideration seems to have been given to the truth that men, particularly in political matters, are not guided by the facts but by their opinions about the facts.—Sir Norman Angell [winner of Nobel Peace Prize, 1933], "Leftism in the Atomic Age," *The Nation* (May 11, 1946), p. 564.

> A legend which is believed has the same value and effect as the truth.—Mr. Visconti, in Graham Greene, *Travels with My Aunt* (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 241.

Public opinion makers are as important as public officials. And they are often more powerful. People in office come and go, but editors and writers, columnists and newscasters, commentators and special feature creators, they remain, and frequently enjoy careers of 35 to over 50 years, while politicians have gone into oblivion or their graves by the freight-train load.[1] Many of them owed their careers to the molders of

---

*This essay in slightly different form will be the introductory chapter of a forthcoming book which will be titled *Hands Across the Volga: American Mass Communication and the Wartime Affair with the Soviet Union, 1941-1947*

[1] Many journalists and commentators of the World War Two era were on radio and television over twenty-five years after the end of the war; the names of Howard K. Smith, Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, Alex Dreier, Richard C. Hottelet, Charles Collingwood, Alexander Kendrick, Cedric Foster, Lowell Thomas, and Cecil Brown come to mind. World War Two journalists such as James Reston, Max Lerner, Joseph Alsop, Ernest K. Lindley, Marquis Childs, David Lawrence and a brigade of others were still writing profusely and very prominently in nationally circulated newspapers and magazines for the same time span after the cessation of formal hostilities. Other radio and newspaper opinion makers of the day such as William L. Shirer have retired to the making of "histories" of this period, and to this day can hardly write about anything else.

political opinion in the first place. Without friendly word-merchants in the newspapers and magazines, and later on the radio and television, what substantial percentage of them would ever have become known outside of the county in which they lived? In the area of public affairs and international relations the impact of the opinion maker is as sharp and often even more profound. The mass of gossip and rumor, innuendo and propaganda which they pour into circulation frequently stays in the information bloodstream of the world indefinitely, and no amount of subsequent research and revision succeeds in unseating these deeply implanted views and opinions. The result has been the evolution of what has been described as "instant history," rarely subject to later alteration or any significant change resulting from a placing of pertinent new material on the agenda, or even a fuller exposition of what was allowed to see the light of day in the first place. In addition, this simultaneous account of the past is often made even less vulnerable to subsequent change by the fact that frequently there have been influential opinion makers involved in the regime in power when this or that series of events transpired. Not only were they responsible for the original version of these happenings as they appeared as historical narrative, but such individuals, by virtue of the vested interest they had in maintaining this account of the past, have tended to act as perpetual watchdogs, at least during their lifetime, to make sure that no significant alteration or replacement of their stories succeeded.

Within a dozen years after World War Two, the primary device for penetrating the home and consciousness of the American citizen for the purpose of forming his tastes and opinions on matters of public affairs and international happenings had become television; radio, once the occupant of this very strategic spot, had declined sharply. A market survey by the Elmo Roper organization in the spring of 1966 concluded that 58% of the total U.S. population turned to TV for news and information " 'about what's going on in the world'," and that 41% of the people interviewed declared that if given conflicting reports on such matters, "they would believe the TV version."[2]

What television has become as a salesman for products and personalities is another matter and is understood by even the dullest mentality, needing little comment here, though one may speculate as to what might have happened had this medium been available to the great political spellbinders of the 1932-1947 era. Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, an influential politician in the launching of the post-

---

[2] *National Observer* (March 14, 1966), p. 1.

war totalitarian liberal world represented in the numerous institutions of which the United Nations is just one, and himself another figure of the war era whose career still goes on into a second generation, recently remarked, probably with a trace of puckishness, that "If [Franklin D.] Roosevelt had had television he might have been proclaimed emperor by acclamation."[3] What television might have been in the hands of the most seductive radio orator of all time, Adolf Hitler, boggles the imagination.

In view of the capsule nature of television presentation, and the necessity for superficiality resulting from the time factor pressures, it may represent a weaker medium than radio for the actual launching of opinion and interpretation, admittedly at a discount by the TV world. Printed sources for opinions and views on foreign affairs must be considered still the primary source for other communications media, even though what the former say often appears in an unrecognizable form after distillation through the channels of the latter.

The world over twenty-five years after the end of World War Two still reflected the historical windfall which set Hitler Germany upon Stalinist Russia, thus giving Germany's Western "democratic" enemies an ally which eventually won almost all the plums which were at stake during the combat, and a large number of others which were not originally at stake therein. No strategy was ever worked out during the struggle for dealing with the re-division of the loaves and fishes subsequent to "victory," and it appears that, given the determination to fight on to an unconditional surrender of the Germans, no other outcome than that of 1945 and ever since was really possible, other than a resumption of the war among the ultimately divided "Allies" upon the defeat of their original common enemy. The Norwegian Socialist politician Trygve Lie, who was the first secretary general of the United Nations between 1946 and 1953, bluntly declared in the fall of 1946 that "The Second World War was prosecuted by the United Nations against Germany long after an equivocal, patched-up armistice was possible," but that no sentiment for a negotiated peace was "allowed to prevent the Allies from continuing until they had won a real and lasting victory."[4]

This really was one of the funniest bits of unconscious political humor of the immediate postwar period, for the "real and lasting victory" had already vanished months before Lie expressed these words, and the "Allies" already were snarling and clawing at one another over the tangible and material effects which survived wartime destruction all over Europe and Asia. On the non-tangible side of things there was even less to show for the horrendous expenditure of life, military hardware, and general resources. No "real and lasting victory" was even faintly approached through the annihilation of the "enemies of freedom," which adventure did not advance the cause of freedom in the least. It simply created vacancies in the ranks of those who were to be counted as enemies of freedom. One cannot imagine how things could possibly have been as bad had the war been brought to an end via a negotiated peace two years or so before unlimited "victory" was achieved, but the regimented opinion-making industry rarely if ever allowed the idea to get loose, let alone permit any serious discussion or consideration of it. And the more Stalinophile the organ of communication, the more ferocious the attack on the opposition to a conclusion of unlimited, saturation power.

---

[3] Quoted by Neil Hickey, "The President Goes to the People," *TV News* (August 22, 1970), p. 7. Fulbright's remark followed his watching a television address by President Richard M. Nixon.

[4] Lie, "A World of Patience," *New Republic* (October 28, 1946), pp. 539-540.

One may take Herr Lie's observation in another way, however, and agree to his correct analysis of the situation, in retrospect: a "lasting" victory was surely achieved by a world-wide interest group and specific ideological element which has in the main organized the largest part of the world as we have known it for over a quarter of a century. In view of the sixty or more wars of varying scope and intensity which have been fought since 1945 it is obvious that the permanent plateau of peace and freedom promised the publics of the "Allies" never even faintly approached realization. But one cannot deny that their "victory" propelled their leaders, political and military, into positions of impressive opulence and power, which remain relatively unimpaired to this day.

One may argue that kind words in behalf of the Soviet war machine were in order in view of the ostensible presence of the SU as an "ally," whatever the sheer chance and coincidence which brought this state of affairs about. But the millions of words of fulsome flattery of Stalin and Stalinism and the bawling acclaim of Stalinist Communism as a form of "economic and social democracy" and the general attitude of apology for this system, or the suppression and censorship of anything critical of it, as well as the systematic attack upon all who dared to challenge it as no better if not actually worse than the systems of the enemy countries, were all utterly unnecessary. They had a very large part to play in aiding the establishment of a form of self-deception and

credulity, which was grounded so firmly and entrenched so deeply that a quarter century of Cold War has still not succeeded in uprooting it or cancelling out its effect and influence.

Most of 1942 and down to the closing weeks of 1943 was the period of the "peoples' war against Fascism." The emphasis had always been one of being *against* something from the beginning, and, if *for* anything, had consisted mainly of platitudinous absolutes starting with Democracy.

The great genius of pro-Soviet propaganda, conscious and otherwise, was to keep the promotion of World War Two on a negative basis until the bacon was in the pot. As long as it was "anti-Fascist" there did not need to be a counter-statement of what the war was being fought *for*. "Victory," tribal revenge and a wide variety of other mindless objectives did not clutter the Soviet ideological cupboard as they did that of their "democratic allies." So all partook cheerfully of an unified "anti-Fascist" war which doubled the extent of Communism's planetary grip at war's end.

Whatever the knavery of the Communists the world over, they must be credited with knowing what they were doing all the time. They fought to save Communism where it already was, and to extend it at the expense of other systems no matter what sort in as many areas as possible. Stalin's Anglo-American allies got "victory," while Russo-Chinese Communism anchored down a third of the world.

To this day there is no intensive critical study of the propaganda of the winning regimes in the Second World War; it is still a holy subject, and taboo. With the exception of smug monographs on how psychological warfare was conducted against the enemy,[5] universally reported as a smashing success, there is nothing yet on how the populaces in the "United Nations" were manipulated for the purposes of maximizing their support of the war and buttressing the policies and decisions of their rulers. It is obvious that in war the mass of those who do the voting, taxpaying, fighting and the dying is rarely acquainted with the real reasons for the conflict. It is important only that it has the right opinions on the facts, not necessarily know what they are.

It is a commonplace observation to note the distance from the real situation by which modern publics are removed. In the Second World War, which witnessed the most fantastic efforts at mobilization of public support via propaganda ever known in the history of warfare, there even were occasional recognitions by those deeply involved. Less than three months before the end of the European phase of the fighting, *Newsweek* morosely observed, "In a war being fought for democracy and freedom, the millions of common men know less about the great decisions that affect their lives than ever before in the history of secret diplomacy."[6] Apparently the cause of "democracy" and "freedom" was so delicate and precarious that those who were going to be the main beneficiaries of both could not be informed as to how they were being secured for subsequent enjoyment. And the complaint came not from an opponent or disbeliever in the war but from one of the publicity organs already doing its best to entrench public support for it.

---

[5] Particularly significant in this area is the book by the English journalist Sefton Delmer, *Black Boomerang* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1962). Of related interest is the English success in recording and splicing together of selected parts of Mussolini's speeches for counter-propaganda rebroadcast, as described by Luigi Villari in his *The Liberation of Italy, 1943-1947* (Appleton, Wisconsin: C.C. Nelson, 1959). See comment by Fred Friendly, below.

"We are living in a wonderful world, the world of propaganda," wrote Rev. James M. Gillis, the editor of the *Catholic World*, in the spring of 1941. "And the most wonderful thing about it is that the propagandists can make it, wreck it, and make it over again and wreck it again in six weeks."[7] Rev. Gillis was writing at a time eight months before American involvement in the war already 20 months along in Europe, but just before the Russo-German phase was to erupt, on June 22, 1941. He was to see subsequently an expansion of what he had described which made everything prior to the latter event appear to be detached veracity by comparison.

Once Americans were a part of the struggle, the full dimension of the battle for the emotional commitment of the populace flowered. The most succinct statement of the matter was made by America's first propaganda minister, Archibald MacLeish, Director of the Office of Facts and Figures, in a speech at Freedom House in New York on March 19, 1942: "The principal battle ground of this war is American opinion."[8] When Walter Millis, analyzing the German enemy in the summer of 1944, announced that "Hitlerism represents, in fact, the highly shrewd and rational discovery that great societies can be swayed, energized, and controlled by the manipulation of the irrational within them, by the direct appeal, in other words, to the psychological reactions, the emotions, of men,"[9] it was obvious that no national state involved in the struggle by this moment could have evaded precisely the same kind of analysis. The full scale assault on the sensibilities of the community in every warring power differed in degree only, a product of differences in local *mores*, and the fortunes of war.

As a study which is in part a history of the period between June, 1941 and June, 1947, or roughly that part of World War Two dating from the start of the Russo-German phase down through the setting in of the Cold War, the program for the "containment" of Communism and the parallel program of European revivification associated with the Marshall Plan, it is only slightly involved with the military prosecution of the war and its extension, and mainly concerned, among other things, with how this was reported to the United States reading public. Far more attention is devoted also to the political promotion of the war and the ideas which were loosed in the community while the war was in progress. It is also concerned with rumor and gossip and their part in the propaganda-public opinion picture. Since authorities ranging from Walter Winchell to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. have solemnly informed us that gossip is a part of history, and much gossip is related to rumor, this aspect deservedly must be examined, though care is being taken to prevent the logical consequence of total dependence on such sources, namely, an account consisting primarily of rumor and gossip. The main concern of this study however is with the rise and fall of the great unrequited political amour in this country with Stalinist Russia, from the involuntary and circumstantial alliance which the USA and USSR found themselves thrown into when their respective policies led to war with Germany and Japan, down through the time six years later when the consequences of "victory" split them apart and ranged them against each other as the great champions of two rival "ways of life." And the main emphasis is upon what was said for public consumption about the war and the subject of Russo-American relations. But the opinions on the events are considered of at least equal importance to the events themselves, and the guesswork, rumination, suspicion, gossip, prediction, sooth-saying and sheer fabrication are part of the record. In a conflict which was so widely advertised by the "United Nations" as the only "war of ideas" ever fought in history, it is important to examine as many of them as possible.

---

[6] "Big Three Hope to Smash Reich by Speeding Its Political Crackup," *Newsweek* (February 12, 1944), pp. 29-30.

[7] Editorial comment in *Catholic World* (May, 1941), p. 136. Rev. Gillis was one of the most lucid of the critical commentators on U.S. foreign affairs and was among the top rank in that capacity during World War II. *Time* (October 27, 1941, p. 77) referred to the *Catholic World* as one of the two most influential Catholic magazines in the country, and along with *Commonweal* the most widely read by non-Catholics.

[8] See restatement of this in the letter from MacLeish to the editors of *Life* (April 20, 1942), p. 8.

[9] Millis, "The Psychological Man," *Virginia Quarterly Review* (Summer, 1944), p. 367.

No one studying the approach of World War II and on down through its end, essentially the 1931-1945 period, and the accompanying opinion-making on foreign politics in the United States, can grasp the situation without a careful examination of the role of the foreign newspaper correspondent. The almost universal belligerent partisanship of this formidable corps of journalists and their effect on the ideas of tens of millions is a factor matched only by the similar political commitments of the radio analysts and "commentators" of and on foreign affairs, though the latter became important mainly in the second half of this roughly fifteen year period. As Malcolm Cowley, veteran editor of the *New Republic,* and a formidable performer in the opinion-making sector himself, observed in April, 1943, "Back in 1935, foreign correspondents were merely tolerated by the great men of the world, but by 1940 they had become political powers capable of influencing their nations and helping to determine the outcome of the war."[10] By the time Cowley wrote, their influence had grown a hundred-fold, and made more complicated by still another development.

At about the time the shooting phase of the war occurred, there had appeared in news reporting and newspaper evolution the news magazines and the columnist respectively, devoted frankly to opinionated reporting and dedicated to supplying the public with a switch from "factual, objective news reporting to a standard of mixing opinion with fact to approximate full truth," as *Time,* itself probably the outstanding exponent of this, put it, in reviewing Ken Stewart's *News is What We Make It.*[11] Just as important an aspect is the reality of editorial judgment and selectivity, which the title of Stewart's book probably stated as clearly and with a minimum of words as one might expect. As Fred Friendly, an influential figure in the radio and television world during the Cold War, expressed it, "You can make a man say almost anything by editing."[12]

---

[10] *New Republic* (April 5, 1943), p. 450.

[11] Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1943; *Time* (July 5, 1943), pp. 68-69.

[12] Quoted by Dwight Newton, "An Interview with the Sergeant about SIN," San Francisco *Examiner* TV Log (April 6, 1958), p. 2. At that time Friendly was research director of the Edward R. Murrow television show "See it Now." Murrow was another of the radio-television personalities whose meteoric rise was related to an apprenticeship as a World War Two broadcaster. Most radio listeners heard his tremulous, poetic broadcasts from London during the German bombings of 1940. Americans heard no broadcasts of RAF bombings of German cities during this time, when the USA were not a belligerent.

Basic to the issue at hand is the frank recognition of the impossibility of isolating fact from opinion, and that furthermore, opinion *is* fact, and interpretation *is* news. And this was not confined to the newspaper and magazine press but integral to the other media, especially radio, government information agencies and the moving picture newsreels, seen every day by millions. Stewart's book bluntly admitted it and *Time,* matched at that moment in obvious and transparent opinionated news-purveying only by the new New York tabloid daily, *PM,* did not evade the implications.

The citizenry does not read about wars in books written by professors of diplomatic history twenty to forty years after the wars are over; they read about them while they are being fought on a daily basis, and they depend almost entirely upon newspapermen, radio reporters, and, more recently, television commentators, to tell them what is taking place. They also depend upon these same sources for the political interpretations of these conflicts, a matter of immense importance. It is this material, written in the heat of the moment, or shortly thereafter, which forms the entire sources in this study. It is necessary to spend some time on these sources in another sense as well. This consists of an examination of their authors and the background and orientation of their employers and organs of publicity. The commitments of an employer of a reporter and of the reporter himself are as significant as what they say, regardless of the professed dedication to "truth" or "objectivity." Furthermore, if a policy exists involving a decision to publish "all the news that is fit to print," it is highly significant that one know what was *not* considered "fit to print," and, if possible, who considered it unfit, and why. Policy and ideological commitments may have far more to do with whether they are published than whether they were "fit" or "unfit" (see note 26).

For sheer volume of words, no war in history was reported so intimately and exhaustively as World War Two. Hundreds of reporters, radio commentators and assorted writers covered the several fronts, turning out thousands of newspaper and magazine articles and score upon score of books, the sale of which made some of the authors rather affluent. For the most part their impressions in the heat of the moment made permanent impact on the readers. And the less accurate and more propagandistic they were, the more likely they were to resist any subsequent alteration by sober historical work in the post-bellum period.

The hyperthyroid reportage of the war in sensational and electrifying books by war correspondents and radio commentators started to pall by the summer of 1943, even though most of the bloodshed and destruction lay ahead. "The saturation point is looming," predicted the publisher Bennett Cerf at this time. But at the same time it was announced that over 900 new correspondents and commentators were "said to have their credentials" and were "awaiting transportation to various fronts."[13] Things quickly picked up again beginning in 1944.

It is unlikely that another war will ever be reported with such gusto, relish and delight as World War Two by Americans, a product in part of the realization of being on the side with insuperable material and manpower advantages, in addition to the long period of mutual conditioning prior to both the outbreak of hostilities in 1939 and American involvement late in 1941. By the time of the Korean war many of the same people were speaking more in a mournful whine than in the "On a Note of Triumph"[14] gloating tones of a Norman Corwin in 1945.

An occasional contemporary examined this reportage and found it short of satisfactory, but not very often. One of the most telling critiques was that of the eminent elder statesman of American journalism, Henry L. Mencken. Early in 1946, Mencken blasted the coverage of the war by the press as having been done not well but "wordily." Mencken described the war correspondents collectively as "a sorry lot, either typewriter-statesmen turning out dope stuff drearily dreamed up, or sentimental human-interest scribblers turning out maudlin stuff about the common soldiers, easy to get by the censors." "The primary duty of reporters is to tell the truth until it becomes dangerous," Mencken insisted, while concluding that in the United States during World War Two, "There wasn't much of that." It would, however, have to be admitted that the situation tallied fairly closely to the analysis of Ernest Bevin, the foreign secretary of the post-war British Labor government, of what happened in England between 1939 and 1945. "A newspaper," declared Bevin shortly after Mencken's post-mortem, "has three functions: to amuse, to entertain, to mislead." It was a rare wartime day when any of these functions was not satisfactorily performed.[15]

---

[13] *Saturday Review of Literature* (June 19, 1943), p. 32.

[14] Reference is to the famous declamation authored by Corwin which was read on radio nationally on V-E Day in May 1945. Corwin, one of the most prolific writers of radio plays, was an early recruit to war propaganda service. "In the fall of 1941," wrote Albert N. Williams, "we were at war, emotionally if not actually, and Archibald MacLeish, Pulitzer Prize poet and Librarian of Congress, was mobilizing the nation's poets and playwrights into a propaganda machine. Corwin, poet, radio dramatist, and "dean," fitted the need perfectly." Williams, "The Radio Artistry of Norman Corwin," *Saturday Review of Literature* (February 14, 1942), pp. 5-6.

[15] Mencken's remarks cited at length in "'A Sorry Lot'," *Time* (January 14, 1946),

Sharing the category described as "typewriter-statesmen" by Mencken with the reporters were the columnists, another journalistic development which reached maturity in the 1930s along with the picture magazines, the comic books and the foreign correspondent. The columnist evolved as a substitute for coherent editorial policy, and often became a shield to conceal a publisher's cowardice. Basically, the columnist was irresponsible, in the best sense of the word, and indulged in turning out material with incredible slants. Most of them did not drift off into flights of omniscience on the subject of foreign affairs until midway between the Russo-German and Cold Wars. Between fifteen and twenty of them dominated the area and as a group had access to a national readership of at least one hundred million circulation.[16] According to Charles Eugene Fisher in his book *The Columnists*,[17] the most influential was Walter Winchell, "the kingfish of gent's room journalism," as the veteran New York writer Stanley Walker described him in 1941.[18] At an early stage in the war, Winchell, whom Fisher termed "the No. 1 propagandist ideologue for World War II" in the United States, was published in 800 American newspapers with a combined circulation of over 25,000,000 copies. His closest competition was Drew Pearson, an equally devoted journalistic warrior who frequently surpassed Winchell in ferocity, whose column appeared in 621 papers with more than 18,000,000 daily distribution.

In addition, both Winchell and Pearson were heard in weekly radio broadcasts which were considered to have from nine to ten million listeners each. Two other powerful radio ideologues with a general left position either exceeded or closely approached Winchell and Pearson: Raymond Gram Swing and William L. Shirer. Swing's career was already immensely advanced before American involvement in

---

pp. 68-69: Bevin quoted in *Time* (February 18, 1946), p. 25.

[16] In the period roughly corresponding to the World War Two era and shortly thereafter (and a few years before the war, perhaps) the principal columnists comprised two nearly equal groups. The contingent usually sympathetic to FDR and the New Deal administration consisted of Walter Lippmann, Raymond Clapper, Drew Pearson, Robert Allen, Dorothy Thompson, George Fielding Eliot, Samuel Grafton, Ernest K. Lindley, Max Lerner, Marquis Childs and Walter Winchell. Their opposite numbers were Mark Sullivan, David Lawrence, Arthur Krock, Frank Kent, George Sokolsky, John O'Donnell, Frank Waldrop, Paul Mallon, Constantine Brown and Westbrook Pegler. *Time* (November 29, 1943, p. 19) reported that FDR read "columnists Clapper and Lippmann regularly."

[17] New York: Howell, Soskin, 1944. See also David Bulman (ed.), *Molders of Opinion* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1945).

[18] In Walker's review of Emile Gavreau's *My Last Two Million Readers* (E.P. Dutton) in *New York Herald Tribune Books* (September 28, 1941), p. 7.

World War Two. Just prior to Pearl Harbor his radio audience was estimated at 20,000,000. This was larger than that of any other commentator. Shirer's star rose after he returned from Hitler Germany, where his writing and radio broadcasts first brought him to American attention, especially after the publication of his book *Berlin Diary*. During the war his influence rose rapidly, both as a result of his analyses of the war which were featured prominently in the New York City press, and his radio program on the Columbia Broadcasting System. His Hooper rating indicated a regular audience of 5,000,000 down even to the spring of 1947, by which time the growing bi-partisan Cold War temper was making his views less palatable. On March 23, 1947 he was dropped by his sponsor, and he resigned from CBS the following week. But Shirer returned to radio on the Mutual Network at the end of November of that year.[19]

A strong case can be made for the thesis that American opinion made by the radio, newsreels and the picture magazines out-performed the sector of the printed word. A special study could be made here, though the elusiveness and the high mortality rate of the source material would be a serious hindrance to documentation. But the facts of the total situation suggest its plausibility. There were more than 65,000,000 radio sets in the United States when entry into the war occurred late in 1941. Movies were attracting tens of millions every week, and the picture magazines, *Life* and *Look*, which appeared in November, 1936 and January, 1937 respectively, and which had half a dozen smaller competitors, had readers in the millions at the height of the war. They probably fixed more views for Henry Wallace's "common man" than any other printed material in existence with the possible exception of the *Reader's Digest*, which enjoyed a circulation of 8,000,000 at the height of the war, going on to 11,000,000 a short time after the end of hostilities in the Pacific.[20] *Life* and *Look* reached a subscriber audience of about 7,000,000 combined during the war, but as the result of a "total readership survey" in the summer of 1947 the trade journal *Publishers' Weekly* estimated their combined readership at nearer 42,000,000.[21] By the early war period *Life* was the most influential magazine in the U.S.A.

A study of public opinion, on world affairs and international politics in particular, should *end* with a study of public opinion polls, not *start* with them. Well before these often-rigged spectaculars, which frequently have an intent to create as much public opinion as to describe or measure it, comes an examination of the sources of the information and influence which enable the people polled to have an opinion on the issue at hand to begin with. How do the people in Grundy Center come to have strong views on the Emir of Mongoositania or the Banat of Ocarina in the first place? The majority of Americans rarely left the state in which they were born, and many spent their entire lives in the *county* in which they were born. It is a consequence of what they read, hear and see, then as well as today. During the Second World War, probably the first two of these were of greatest importance, as television had not evolved past the pilot plant stage.

Allowance must be made for moving picture newsreels, however, and propaganda films, which undoubtedly had a vast influence. Of extreme importance in this category was the movie short subject "The March of Time," jointly produced by the editors of *Time* and *Life* every month, and distributed to virtually every movie theater in the land by Twentieth Century Fox. The makers of these films claimed that "thirty million minds a month" "focussed" on these glorified newsreels and their potent editorial message, which was anything but sub-liminal.[22] Films worked down the intelligence scale to serve with great effectiveness on the lowest levels, where reading skills tailed off to zero (adult illiterates numbered in the millions), and where a vocabulary of less than a thousand words made even listening to the radio with profit highly problematical. In one sense, everything that appeared on the screens of the nation's moving picture houses would warrant attention in view of the famed actor Orson Welles's dramatic telegram to the editors of *Time* a little over a year before the end of World War II, in which he declared, "Every movie expresses, or at least reflects, political opinion."[23] There was no need for Mr. Welles to call attention to the influential contingent of Central European refugees occupying key positions in the film making industry who were some of the war era's most effective political opinion makers, among others.

---

[19] Richard Wilson, "Drew Pearson—He's Sometimes Wrong," *Look* (November 26, 1946), p. 21. The title had reference to Pearson's sensational "Predictions of Things to Come," the closing portion of his weekly Sunday night oration, which included from time to time prognostications which were hilariously short of the mark. There were occasional observations that there was almost no relationship between Pearson's credibility and his ability to maintain his listening audience. On Swing, see the extended plug in *Look* (October 21, 1941), "World's Most Important Contact Man," pp. 12-15. On Shirer, see *Publishers' Weekly* (April 10, 1947), p. 2125; (November 29, 1947), p. 2460.

[20] The *Reader's Digest* alone among the country's major periodicals supplied no figures to the standard source compiling them, *N. W. Ayer and Son's Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals*, published in Philadelphia. For stories on the *Digest* circulation figures cited above see the press section of *Time* (February 21, 1944), p. 43; (December 10, 1945), p. 58. These figures concern the domestic circulation of this monthly.

[21] *Publishers' Weekly* (August 23, 1947), p. 720.

[22] See advertisement in *Time* (October 7, 1946), p. 115.

John U. Nef, in his *Universities Look For Unity*,[24] spoke disparagingly of the "skimming public" of the "newspapers, picture papers, popular magazines, textbooks and best sellers." What he actually described was the overwhelming majority of the community in this country, and indirectly probably every other country too. It is impossible to over-estimate the importance of these mass circulation printed sources, from which the vast part of the semi-literate-to-literate populace derived the preponderant part of their views. No adequate history of public opinion on any subject, and foreign policies in particular, can be written from sources read by a fraction of one percent of the country's population supplemented by summaries of public opinion polls. The research for this study included a page-by-page examination of every article on the subject of world affairs in the weekly picture magazines, and every major weekly or monthly family magazine, with the exception of those directly angled at a readership exclusively of women.

Of the seven thousand periodicals being published in the United States during the 1940s, about 15 accounted for roughly one half of the combined circulation of all. In mid-1944, over 80% of all newsstand sales of American magazines were accounted for by just eighteen of them, nine of which are among the twenty-seven selected for examination in this study. Just five of them (*Life, Look, Saturday Evening Post, Collier's* and *American Magazine*), had by the end of the period under examination a total readership of nearly 77,000,000 persons. Gilbert Seldes' declaration, in the course of a review of Theodore Peterson's *Magazines in the Twentieth Century*, that "the magazine is too potent to be irresponsible," is a highly debatable thesis, but potency and influence of magazines are beyond any possible doubt. Their impact is even heightened in significance if one keeps in mind their effect not only in forming or changing opinion, but in sustained mass *reflection* of opinion originating elsewhere, one particular area of great importance. In this sense the multi-million circulation family and picture magazines served as transmission belts for a wide assortment of opinions, views and convictions on the subject of Stalin and

---

[23] Welles's wire reproduced in *Time* (March 6, 1944), p. 6.

[24] New York: Pantheon Books, 1943.

the Soviet which originated elsewhere, most frequently in journals of extremely modest circulation, but in many cases related to the daily press, their columnists and the news magazines.

The latter was one of the most striking innovations of twentieth century magazine journalism. Nothing of its kind existed until well into the post-World One era. *Time*, the prototype of this branch of opinion makers, led a field of three in 1941, and dated back to 1923. Its rivals, *Newsweek* and *U. S. News*, both founded in 1933, were steadily gaining influence, but flagged behind. *Time's* circulation exceeded three quarters of a million when the U.S. became a belligerent in the war, while the combined total of its competitors barely exceeded half a million. Considered as a unit, however, the growing strength of these journals was evident, and with the adding of special columnists of their own who concerned themselves entirely with opinion on the news being reported, their influence was documented on a week-by-week basis throughout the war. In essence they became America's first nationally-circulated newspapers. Though all three presented news in a format which rarely made possible the identification of the writer, the content of what appeared did not necessarily reflect the same kind of impersonal "objective" detachment. In fact, there was frequently a direct correlation between the sharpness of the views expressed and the protection furnished by the anonymity of the journal's policy of unsigned material. "Bylines" were reserved for opinion columnists, while frequently dispatches from foreign correspondents were attributed to them directly. Thus the specious Olympian appearance of news stories succeeded admirably in getting launched as completely impartial and impassive stands a surprising collection of pure opinions and emotional convictions, and in getting them entrenched as presumably unmovable, permanent "fact."

It cannot be denied that opinion-makers of the most determined kind flourished under the mantle of faceless journalism. *Time* at one stage of the 1930s had so many Communists on its staff that they were able to get out a parody edition of the parent organ which specialized in Stalinist propaganda versions of the stories being carried in the regular editions. This was also true of the Hearst newspapers but a large majority of the papers and magazines in in New York City were heavily staffed with Communists and fellow travelers, however. *Time* carried no signed material by columnists, but did identify its foreign correspondents' work when the editors considered it particularly exemplary. In *Life* and the other main organ of the American Century Press, *For-*

tune, founded in 1930, most of the work was signed, but important editorials in both frequently were anonymous. By the time America became involved in World War II the lead news section "National Affairs" had become *Time's* most important department, and the staff of *Time* overwhelmingly leftward-inclined. "National Affairs" was as much an opinion-manufacturing precinct as it was a news department, and was employed massively in 1940 in the unsuccessful effort to get Wendell Willkie elected president. No account of the world of journalism and its infighting during this time should overlook the testimony of T. S. Matthews in his autobiography *Name and Address*.[25] Matthews, a product of *New Republic* training in the 1920s, served *Time* in all capacities between 1929 and 1953, including stints as managing editor and editor in chief, and shared editorial chores with Whittaker Chambers during the war. At one stage Matthews denounced bitterly "the distortions, suppressions and slanting of political 'news'," which he said seemed to him "to pass the bounds of politics and to commit an offense against the ethics of journalism." This complaint was made by Matthews against his own colleagues who put *Time* together every week during the early 1950s. One need not only imagine the forces at work tailoring the foreign news in *Time* between 1941 and 1947, just because Matthews says little of significance about it. Nevertheless, that so many of the largest, wealthiest and most influential opinion-making publications were staffed at so many of their most strategic posts by persons whose basic interest was the welfare of Stalinist Communism is not a reflection upon them.[26] It is far more an

---

[25] New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960. See the penetrating review in *Human Events* (July 14, 1960), pp. 281-282. Matthews became managing editor of *Time* in 1943.

[26] In the celebrated December 18, 1947 election for officers of the American Newspaper Guild in New York City, the Communist-backed candidate, ANG executive vice president John Ryan, carried a majority of the votes from fifteen of thirty-two publications whose chapters took part. Ryan lost by a total vote of 2655 to 2042. The New York *Times* chapter voted for the Communist-backed candidate, 510 to 260, while the *Time*, Inc. chapter voted against him by the narrow margin of four votes, 183-179. The Associated Press chapter voted anti-Communist by almost as close a vote, 110-104. See the interesting analysis of the struggle for the control of the newspaper union by the *Time/Life* reporter and researcher, Jeanne Perkins Harman, *Such is* Life (London: Hammond, Hammond & Co., 1959), chapter 12.

On the subject of highly placed Communists in the news media in those times and what is "fit to print," Mrs. Harman remarked, "there is often as much sin in omission as in commission. A zealous Party supporter would be just as roundly congratulated for keeping something *out* of the public eye as he would for getting something in. And that, given the high casualty rate on stories anyway, is comparatively easy to accomplish."

indictment of their opulent and in many cases nationally prominent employers, who must be assumed to have had enough intelligence to know whom they were hiring and to understand what they were saying in print after their employment. The propaganda may have originated abroad or in small and exotic domestic journals, but the really important purveyors of the views involved in this propaganda were the prosperous mass circulation publications, which was true as well for the agencies of the picture, film and spoken word.

Newsweek, which bore the banner slogan over its head each week, "A Well-Informed Public is America's Greatest Security," underwent a reorganization in 1937, accompanied by a change in ownership and "publicity direction." Beginning with the issue of October 4 of that year, it presented a much enlarged opinion and editorial emphasis in its reporting. It also featured columns, that by Raymond Moley being the first, followed by that of Ernest K. Lindley after the European War broke out on September 3, 1939. Several columnists were added to supply "inside" analysis of the war, but confining themselves to military matters almost entirely. A column devoted mainly to economic criticism was written by Ralph Robey.

U. S. News followed the format of *Time* in presenting unsigned news columns, but each issue was decorated by a full page editorial by its founder, David Lawrence, material which sometimes appeared first in daily newspapers but some of which did not. A feature of *U. S. News* nearly every week was a question on some current issue submitted to a wide variety of knowledgeable or prominent men for their comments, a type of specialty public opinion poll confined to those considered informed enough, and familiar enough to the general readership to exert some influence in opinion-making. Another unique *U. S. News* feature was a column or two of summarizations of editorial opinion of the daily press nationwide on events and controversies of the moment.

No account of the electrifying innovations in the field of mass communication of the 1930s, just in time for the astounding wartime expansion and influence, would be complete without a mention of the evolution of the book club. It deserves equal status with the news and picture magazines and the sound newsreels. In 1931, book clubs accounted for a negligible part of the total of book sales; fifteen years later, as the Cold War began to set in, the book clubs sold half as many books as the total of the nation's book stores and department stores put together.

By the 1945-1947 period there were six prominent ones: the Book League, the Dollar Book Club and the Literary Guild of America, all controlled by the publisher Doubleday; The Book of the Month Club; the People's Book Club, controlled by Simon and Schuster; and the Book Find Club. Together they enrolled 3½ million members in the spring of 1946 and sold 75 million books at that moment.[27] The Literary Guild sales were in excess of half a million. About 450,000 of the Book of the Month Club's 925,000 members took its selection of the month. The People's Book Club, with 300,000 members, reached a vastly larger audience, in that its promotional literature went out to 28 million receivers of Sears Roebuck catalogs as well.[28] Doubleday's three clubs distributed 15 million pieces of direct-mail advertising in the last year of the war. One can understand the critical importance of the place of the book club when it decided to make one of its choices a book of serious concern in the field of foreign politics, especially if it carried a strong factional slant. (It was the nationally read literary critic Harry Hansen who pointed out as early as January, 1943 that America's eight best-selling books on Stalinist Russia were "first hand reports" "characterized by their sympathetic attitude toward the Soviets."[29]) And its impact can be calculated to be even more profound when action resulted from collaboration with such a wartime propaganda agency as the Council on Books in Wartime, or the War Writers' Board. Even the staid and unexcitable *Publishers' Weekly* could voice the observation that "The Council on Books in Wartime has been one of the most powerful influences in promoting the sale of war books."[30]

"Books are Weapons in the War of Ideas" was the slogan suggested by the publisher W.W. Norton, chairman of the Council on Books in Wartime. This was later rephrased and popularized by President Roosevelt, and a book nominated by this Council as a recommendation promptly was given copious national attention and sold in vast quantities. A book did not need to be the beneficiary of such an immense national spotlight to gain major attention as an influential and significant opinion-forming force. As Curtice Hitchcock, president of the publishing house of Reynal and Hitchcock, pointed out in a speech in London in the fall of 1942, "The small slim volume, which has a circulation of only 500 or 1,000 copies, may easily be of far greater intrinsic importance than the great best seller."[31] But, for the most part, the significant opinion-molding books of World War Two and after were the massively promoted and widely sold books of the major publishers. Such enterprises had been coming into business at a rate of better than one a year since 1924, and they continued to do so into the early years of the Cold War.[32] Though these organizations were accompanied by much larger numbers of smaller publishing houses, the output of significant books by the latter was far smaller. In England, some 200 new publishers went into business in the year 1943 alone.[33] The shortage of paper and skilled labor seemed to be no obstacle to this burgeoning enterprise in Britain or in America.

A most dramatic example of the process is seen in the case of the book *One World,* by the prestigious Republican political figure Wendell Willkie.[34] It was published on April 8, 1943 by Simon and Schuster, and sold almost a quarter of a million copies in less than one week. An appearance by Willkie on radio's best known talk show, "Information Please," four days after the publication date, helped out. On July 1 Willkie was a guest on the radio "Words at War" program sponsored by the Council on Books in Wartime, and received several other strong radio plugs by such luminaries of the air in those times as Alexander

---

[27] See report of the first extended study of American reading habits since the publication of the Cheney Report of 1931 in *Publishers' Weekly* (April 20, 1946), pp. 2191-95. On 1946 book club sales see *Time* (March 18, 1946), pp. 82-83.

[28] "Doubleday Plans Fiftieth Anniversary Celebration in 1947," *Publishers' Weekly* (December 21, 1946), p. 3291. On the promotional activities of the book clubs, see "Book Clubs Seek Wider Markets," *Publishers' Weekly* (July 6, 1946), pp. 52-55.

[29] Hansen, "American Literary Output in 1942," *Publishers' Weekly* (January 16, 1943), pp. 236-37.

[30] *Publishers' Weekly* (May 22, 1943), p. 1953.

[31] Hitchcock, "The Common Heritage," an address in Mansion House of the Lord Mayor of London, where he was a guest at a dinner sponsored by the Publishers Association and the Associated Booksellers of Great Britain and Ireland, in *Publishers' Weekly* (December 19, 1942), p. 2419.

[32] Isidor Schneider, "*Publishers' Weekly* and the Book Trade Since World War I," *Publishers' Weekly* (January 18, 1947), pp. 307-324.

[33] See story by London publisher Stanley Unwin in *Times Literary Supplement* (February 12, 1944) p. 79. According to Unwin the Publishers Association had numbered only 130 firms for the entire country in 1939. Unwin's account was challenged by L. Shenfield (*TLS*, February 19, 1944, p. 91) but vigorously reasserted by Unwin the following week (*TLS*, February 26, 1944, p. 103).

[34] Rumors began very soon that the book was actually written by Joseph Barnes, foreign editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, and Gardner Cowles, publisher of *Look* and a member of the massive domestic propaganda agency, the Office of War Information. These two men accompanied Willkie on his impressive world tour and appeared with him in a succession of photographs taken at various places, including the Kremlin, where Willkie visited the Soviet Premier Stalin. Cowles left the OWI on June 20, 1943. It has been suggested whimsically from time to time that there is a need for a study which might be titled *A History of the Ghost-Written Books of World War Two.*

Woollcott, Gabriel Heatter and Walter Winchell, reaching additional millions of the citizenry.

By April 24, it had sold 400,000 copies, breaking all American publishing records. On May 6, *One World* was named by the CBW as its third "imperative" book of the war, and its sales now made a bewildering leap. On May 3 the publishers announced that 880,000 copies had been printed; this was adjusted upward to 1,115,000 copies on May 15.[35] The Council's citation of *One World* declared the book "A vivid picture of the leaders and people of many of the Allied nations and their views as to the future. Its publication marks a definite turning point, a new starting place, in our attitude toward international affairs."[36]

In July, the publishers ran an advertisement for *One World* in the newspapers for ten consecutive days which consisted of one sixth as many words as were in Willkie's entire book, in actuality, a digest of the book. By this time there were a million and a quarter copies in print, and the publishers announced that actual sales totalled 1,186,577 less than five months after publication.[37] And a translation was already a best seller in the Danish underground at the same moment.[38] *One World,* whatever one might have said about its naïveté and smile provoking oversimplifications, was the most vigorously promoted political book in United States history. It was also the major initial propaganda effort employed to prepare the American public to contemplate favorably a new global political organization to replace the League of Nations.

---

[35] The CBW had become a permanent agency on June 18, 1942. Its first two "imperative" books had been William L. White's *They Were Expendable,* and John Hersey's *Into the Valley,* books about combat in the Far East theater in the Philippines and on the island of Guadalcanal, respectively. There were occasional critics of the "imperative" idea. The best known was the ace *Herald Tribune* book reviewer Lewis S. Gannett. He attacked the CBW's scheme in a radio broadcast on New York's station WMCA on March 23, 1943, less than two weeks before the launching of the Willkie book, and again in debate with the publisher Bennett Cerf on WQXR on March 31. He thought the Council was "indulging in too much propaganda" and that the public was "in danger of being regimented." A full report on Gannett's talks was carried in *Publishers' Weekly* (April 10, 1943), pp. 1502-03. The only thing of the magnitude of the Willkie edition during the war was the report in *Newsweek* that "pro-Communist groups are having 1,000,000 abridged copies of the Dean of Canterbury's pro-Stalin book *The Soviet Power* rushed off the press for distribution at five cents each." *Newsweek* (July 21, 1941), p. 8. No formal verification of this press run was made.

[36] *Publishers' Weekly* (May 8, 1943), pp. 1805-06.

[37] *Publishers' Weekly* (July 3, 1943), p. 41; (September 4, 1943), p. 806.

[38] *Publishers' Weekly* (September 25, 1943), p. 1163.

Extended attention to radio dissemination and mass circulation magazine distribution of ideas during the Second World War should not persist to the point of ignoring potent sources of the ideas themselves, often in journals with very limited but extremely influential readership. Of considerable significance were venerable literary monthlies such as *Harper's* and the *Atlantic,* and the two leading weekly voices of liberalism, the *Nation* and the *New Republic.* The latter two, probably no more firmly in the grasp of the warrior and world interventionist sector of liberalism than the former, with a pronounced list of a favorable bent toward Stalinist Russia and toward various collectivist solutions of American policy questions as well, deserve special scrutiny. They, and their close newspaper cousin, the New York City afternoon tabloid *PM,* founded in 1940 principally to insert into the journalistic world a pro-war opinion voice unhampered by the restraint and circumspection of other equally belligerent but less reckless papers, can hardly be over-estimated as fountainheads for a constant flow of pro-Stalinist propaganda which did not slacken in their pages until the outbreak of the Korean War in mid-1950.

Testimony to their influence is not hard to find; a few citations may suffice. Roy Roberts, managing editor of the Kansas City *Star,* in a syndicated column published shortly after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, reported on his wartime observations of their impact in the nation's capital in this manner: "*PM,* a left-wing newspaper in New York with small circulation, the *Nation,* and the *New Republic,* were gospels of the New Deal. . . . They were bibles in Washington." A similar tribute was delivered a few weeks earlier by one of the veteran senior reporters of the Chicago *Tribune,* Alex Small. "Like *Harper's* and the *Atlantic* these weeklies [*Nation* and *New Republic*] are read by people who have weight in their communities," Small observed, adding the appraisal "If asked which has the more effect on policy, the *Saturday Evening Post* with its 3,400,000 circulation or *The Nation* with its 42,000 my choice would be the latter."[39]

---

[39] Small's story on the influence of the four magazines was published in the *Chicago Tribune* for March 18, 1945. He went on to assert with respect to the *Nation* and *New Republic,* "They are for war, war anywhere and with everyone who is not of their religion. An itch for mischief especially seems to possess the dynamic Freda Kirchwey, today the dominating spirit of *The Nation.* If there is anything anywhere to add to the misery of this tortured world, any blazing injustice, any despicable sham, any foul deed, you may be sure that the *New Republic* and *The Nation* are for it." A summary of the views of Roberts and Small appeared in "T.R.B."'s Washington Notes column in *New Republic* (April 30, 1945), p. 586.

Probably the most pointed tribute to the impact and effect of the liberal weeklies was their use by the organization of Edward L. Bernays, described by *Time* as "the country's outstanding counsel on public relations," and "U. S. publicist No. 1." The Bernays efforts to influence the formation of wartime and postwar policy on broad levels were promoted every month in full page discourses printed on the inside front cover of both. "Our monthly messages in *The Nation* and *The New Republic* attempt as a public service, within the limits they can, to bring to the attention of 65,000 thoughtful and influential readers the public relations aspects of certain vital problems," said Bernays in the spring of 1943; "we choose *The Nation* and *The New Republic* as media, because through them we reach an opinion molding public which translates ideas into social action."[40]

Just what kind of "social action" the liberal weeklies were expert at, as referred to by Bernays, may have been buried in political rhetoric for all an untrained onlooker might have known, but the anti-Stalinist leftwing *Partisan Review* a year later spared no steampower in analyzing it. "We have in our midst a powerfully vocal lobby willing to override all concerns of international democracy and decency in the interests of a foreign power," spoke its editorial "The 'Liberal' Fifth Column"; "The foci of this infection are the newspaper *PM*, and the liberal weeklies *The Nation* and *The New Republic*."[41] The fifteen-page editorial created only one misconception: that this ardent concern for the welfare of Stalinism was a recent development in liberal centers. Liberalism's weekly press had a more than fifteen year record of Stalinist apologetics at the moment the *Partisan Review* took it to task, and only seemed to be lopsided in its promotion of this concern in the spring of 1946. It had created a deep separation within the ranks of liberalism in plumping so exuberantly for war in the period prior to American involvement in December, 1941. And it had worked away with a sure and steady pro-Soviet orientation throughout the war. What provoked the attack in *Partisan Review* was primarily the refusal of the American liberal weekly press, with all its prestige and influence, to adopt the anti-Stalinist stance called for by the Cold War. In this sense it was more consistent than its new critics; Stalinist "social action" moving abreast of the Red Army had put the capitals of twelve European countries squarely under the control of the Soviet. It was a foreseeable and expectable consequence of the great "Last War," as one febrile liberal editor sought to name World War Two.

A very large part of the problem, from the point of view of American ideology, emotion, opinion and sentiment, consisted of the split personality which had fought the war. Especially after June 22, 1941 when Stalinist Russia became a formal belligerent against Germany and was promptly hailed with acclamation and promises of aid from Britain's Winston Churchill and America's Franklin D. Roosevelt, a long standing division in the USA became extended to new dimensions. Even the spectacle of Churchill and FDR and their various lieutenants standing on the deck of H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* off the coast of Newfoundland in August, 1941, singing *Onward Christian Soldiers*,[42] did not allay the disquiet felt in large circles in America over the new "ally" in Eurasia. Even the promulgation of the new set of war aims in the ill-fated Atlantic Charter failed to help out here.

Undoubtedly the massive pro-Soviet propaganda program of 1942-1945 did change the views of many Americans and induced a level of mellowness toward Soviet Communism among a sizable number who had never entertained such views before. But it would appear that most of the new pro-Soviet feelings were incubated by the most advanced sector of the populace from the point of view of formal education. A *Fortune* magazine survey in September 1945 noted that about 200 books concerned with Russia had been published in the USA since the beginning of 1943 to that moment. Furthermore, of all the newspaper editorials in US newspapers concerned with foreign affairs in the first half of 1945, more than 20% dealt directly with Russia. The journal concluded from the tone of all this print that "In the mind of the U.S. public there is little doubt of the importance of friendly relations with Russia." Elmo Roper, who conducted this poll, further concluded that "Russophobes" were "in a minority of less than 10 per cent," and that "those cool toward Russia" were a "mere 11 per cent."[43]

---

[40] The Bernays messages usually occupied the entire inside front cover of the *Nation* and *New Republic;* that of March 19, 1945 was typical.

[41] Editorial, "The 'Liberal' Fifth Column," *Partisan Review* (Summer, 1946), pp. 279-293.

[42] *Time* (August 25, 1941), pp. 11-14. The issue of aid to Stalin was mentioned by Roosevelt in his first press conference after returning from the policy meeting with Churchill, with the objective of keeping the Soviets fighting into the spring of 1942. The United States was not yet a belligerent.

[43] "U.S. Opinion on Russia," *Fortune* (September, 1945), p. 233. This famous sample of American opinion on the U.S.S.R. came just a short while before a sensational Roper poll, published in *Fortune* (January, 1946), p. 222, which asked the question, "Do you think we [the USA] did or did not deliberately provoke Japan into making war against us?" The replies:

The swiftness of the about-face in most circles of the American populace on the subject of Stalinist Russia, once the propaganda spigots began to supply unfriendly instead of sympathetic substance, suggests that a vast underground existed throughout the war which never accepted this aspect of the war program and swiftly rejected it once given a chance to do so without running too severe a risk to personal safety.

Perhaps Roper had not extended his survey on attitudes toward Stalinism far enough down the educational ladder, and he surely had chosen to ignore nation-wide expressions of pessimism about the failure of the domestic propaganda. As early as September, 1943 Palmer Hoyt, director of the domestic branch of the Office of War Information, had been quoted as observing that "This war has not been sold to the American people—believe it or not."[44]

A major and very gloomy roundup of the whole subject was made by the editors of *Life* in an outraged editorial six months later.[45] Most of the left wing ideology behind the war had failed miserably to sell itself by then for sure. Scores of sources in 1943 and 1944 had reported the apathy and even sharp anger at the war fronts at attempts to get across the slogans and verbal reflexes of 1939-1942. Though there were no reflections cast upon the bravery and determination to win among the armed forces, the political fixations of European emigrés and the compact of powerful pro-war ideologues seemed never to have got off the ground even by this late moment.

Though liberal journals and journalists had been bewailing this for some time, the *Life* call for the instilling of pro-war politics in the armed forces managed to outdo the previous ones in pathetic quality. The plea contained the usual retreat into hopes for a "durable peace" based on "continued agreement among the Big Three." But enough sentiment was already loose in March, 1944 to convince even an editor of *Life* that such "agreement" was going to have one of history's shortest life spans.

Churchill's speech the week before in which he had declared that military expediency governed Allied political behavior toward Europe and that "This is not a time for ideological preferences" further discommoded the editors. They were sorry that the Moscow and Teheran conferences had produced such a thin dribble of insubstantial material on the politics of the war. They were also ready to concede that the Atlantic Charter[46] was not to apply to either Poland or Germany; part of the former was sure to go to Communist Russia, and part of the latter to Poland, as compensation. The editors further lamented that Roosevelt "had never ventured to express an American point of view about postwar Europe," and they were quite impatient with the "moral globalisms" of Secretary of State Hull, especially his reiterations about the "peace-loving" nations. The editors were circumspect enough to make no observation to the effect that such sloganeering made Hull sound like a 1937 Communist newspaper editorial.

The editors did not involve themselves with the subject of growing apprehensiveness in the country over the likely outcome of the war in Europe, but it had been gnawing away at the consciousness of the American Century publications for some time. The administration's press opposition, in particular the Hearst newspapers, had been scored many times for their scare headlines warning of the threat of a "Red Europe" at hostilities' end. *Time,* in scoffing at the Hearst predictions in their issue of the same week which contained their sister journal's lament over the poor state of political sentiment in the armed forces, even had the bad taste to cite *Pravda* and the *Daily Worker* in rebuttal of Hearst.[47] In *Time*'s view, this was premature and vulgar anti-Com-

---

	Total	West Coast	Southwest
Did (%)	14	22.1	2.8
Did not	70.6	69	85.5
Don't know	15.4	8.9	11.7

The question was timely, in that the administration was conducting its investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack four years earlier. Despite the propaganda of righteousness which had saturated the field since the time of Pres. Roosevelt's "Day of infamy" address and the largely whitewash proceedings of the various Washington investigations, it was a little surprising that nearly 30% of those polled either agreed that the Roosevelt regime had provoked the Japanese attack on Hawaii or were sufficiently unconvinced as to the administration's innocence to refuse to give it a vote of confidence on the question.

The nearly one out of four on the Pacific Coast who believed the Japanese had been goaded into attacking Pearl Harbor may have been especially sobering. In any event the Roper organization did not ask such a question again, and from this point on the salvagers of the wartime propaganda made a substantial industry out of defending the administration against the persistent little contingent of revisionists during the following quarter of a century.

[44] Quoted in *New Republic* (September 6, 1943), p. 335.

[45] Editorial, "Last Call For War Aims," *Life* (March 6, 1944), p. 34.

[46] It was a moment of increasing woes for the Atlantic Charter and its defenders, especially after President Roosevelt admitted that it was not a formal document but a set of notes handed to the radio operators of the U.S.S. *Augusta* and H.M.S. *Prince of Wales* as a sort of press release. This stimulated the following bit of doggerel from the *Chicago Tribune*: "For three long years you let us think/The famed Atlantic Charter, Inc./Was signed and sealed and guaranteed/By which all nations would be freed./But now we're told the document/Was just a memo of intent/An idyll written on a boat/When you were fishing for our vote."

[47] "Red Rule v. Chief Rule, I," *Time* (March 6, 1944), p. 50.

munism on the part of Hearst, too close to the similar warnings derived from the German propaganda minister, Josef Goebbels. Furthermore it emanated from unsympathetic centers, and supporters of the administration had not entirely shed their conviction that opposition was a first cousin to treason. The only anti-Communism approved of by *Time* was that of the Social Democratic Federation's organ the *New Leader*, which excluded Stalinists, Trotskyists, Norman Thomas Socialists, and the American liberals whom the *New Leader* designated the "Kremlin set."[48] All in all, whatever appeared on the surface, a delicate business was going on throughout all sectors of opinion in the last fifteen months of the European phase of World War Two, with incredible consequences growing out of the new policy of military expediency.[49] Its outcome was being freely predicted by seers from right to left, including both, and the preponderant majority of them were proven correct by events.

As a force which had looked upon it all with a mellow gaze while it was transpiring, the liberal press was in no political or psychic state of mind to reverse itself in the Spring of 1946 when Winston Churchill formally called upon the "free nations" to try to undo what they had done so admirably while in concert with Communist Russia. Samuel Grafton, a far-left columnist who enjoyed a meteoric rise to popularity during the war, expressed the basic situation about as good as one might hope for even before the United States was formally engaged in combat. He saw the western powers ranged against Germany hoping to gain the manpower and resources of the Soviet in bringing Hitler's regime down without having to allocate any of the fruits of this victory to Stalin, a hope which Grafton put in the same class as that of expecting water to flow uphill. So when the liberal press and its leftist cousins (with the exception of such anti-Stalinist standouts as *Common Sense*, Morris Rubin's *The Progressive*, *The New Leader*, *Partisan Review* and the *Call*) stood by the Soviet Union in the enjoyment of its war booty as it had hailed the taking of it in the first place, it was not engaging in a sinister new maneuver; it was standing by a policy position supported, with a few lapses such as during the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939-1941, for almost a generation.

When the editors of *Partisan Review*, in their attack on the Stalinist tendencies and propensities of the liberal weeklies and *PM*, spoke of "the subtle internal politics of book reviewing that goes on week by week," they opened up once more a subject of prime importance in the world of opinion-making. In this field there occurred a concerted "slanting" almost continuously in many more influential papers and magazines than those under attack, and no study of the portrayal of the Soviet Union in the United States between 1941 and 1947 could do more than faint justice to the subject without extensive attention to the reviewing of significant books pertinent to the issue during that time. There is massive evidence that the attack on books hostile to editorial ideology and the parallel effusive promotion of books in harmony with editorial ideology was not exclusively a property of the liberal press or other journals specializing in opinion. Frequently, much more aggravated examples of these techniques could be found in sources which at least gave lip service to detachment or "objectivity." Especially influential were the Sunday book review magazines of the New York *Times* and New York *Herald Tribune*, which, combined, reached a circulation of over a million and a half every Sunday at the end of the war, and the weekly *Saturday Review of Literature*, which reached a subscriber audience about the size of either of the liberal weeklies. These three concentrated exclusively on reviewing current books at length and in considerable number. But all 27 journals under examination in this study reviewed books, frequently just particular volumes intended for mass opinion influencing, which received prodigious publicity.

Far more people read reviews of books than they do the actual books. Reviews of a book may appear in daily, weekly, monthly and quarterly journals with a combined circulation of fifteen to twenty million copies and a combined theoretical total readership of several times that number. The book in question may sell no more than a few thousand copies and still exert tremendous influence upon opinion because of the impact of the reviewer's opinion of the book. By the time a potential reader has read from five to ten reviews, all of one kind or another, it is unlikely that even reading the book would do much toward altering the view he has already acquired. So, although it may appear that the function of book reviewing is to acquaint the potential buyer with what is being presented for sale by a publisher, over the years particularly in the field of books on public affairs and international relations, a major unstated objective is to fix views on the book and its contents among the multitude which will not read it.

---

[48] *Time* (March 20, 1944), pp. 60, 62. The *New Leader* at that time was run by Samuel M. Levitas, Daniel Bell, William E. Bohn and Liston Oak. While the war was on, this journal and the *American Mercury* under Eugene Lyons were the only domestic journals whose continuous criticism of Communist policy influence in liberal organizations enjoyed relative toleration.

[49] Another amusing commentary in verse form in the *Chicago Tribune* in July, 1944 on the incredible jungle which events of the war had made out of American foreign policy spoke volumes:

"Who's a friend? and who's a foe?/It's so difficult to know/Once we praised the honest Finn/Now we find him steeped in sin/In the spring we spurned de Gaulle/May embrace him in the fall/Hear the gentle Stalin purr?/Once we called him murderer/Italy, once damned as bloody/Now is welcomed as a buddy/Franco, Mussolini's chum/Rates no longer as a bum/We are still against Benito/But (pro tem) we're fond of Tito/Who's a foe? and who's a friend?/It's embarrassing, no end."

John Maynard Keynes once observed that economic policy was invariably the result of the putting into practice of ideas of economists which were first expressed in books which the practical policy makers never read. In a similar fashion, views on foreign political systems, world politics and international political personalities are often the basis for action, and the support of that action, by people who know nothing about the subjects other than the opinions they have encountered, launched in turn by other people whose information is derived from still other people's books. Again one must keep in mind Sir Norman Angell's discourse on political action as a consequence of opinions on facts, not understanding of the facts themselves. A grasp of this situation helps one to understand better the fundamental strategic importance of a well-planted book review, as well as the *Partisan Review* editors reference to "the subtle internal policies of book reviewing" in the periodical press.

There is one area of research in opinion-making in which it is exceedingly hard to work: that in which views are formed by leaving things unsaid. Agreements to suppress embarrassing or compromising facts are uncommonly hard to uncover, and sometimes there are broad general agreements by various media which are unpublicized, such as that of the newsreel companies in the 1930s not to show films of President Roosevelt trying to ambulate, presumably in the desire to conceal his physical handicap and preserve the illusion of great strength and vitality which his posture during speeches and radio broadcasts reflected. But this is of an altogether different cut from other kinds of alteration of the record by means of leaving things unsaid.

In matters involving the Soviet during the Second World War there was for instance the studious avoidance by almost all sources and publicists of the issue of Communist concentration camps, which the Cold War period investigators found to be as numerous, more lethal, and containing far more people than those of the Hitler regime in Germany. Only a tiny scattering of references to this phenomenon ap-

peared in print between late 1941 and the blooming of the Cold War, and even very few well after the latter date. As noteworthy as this, and one which made its way to the surface while the war was still in progress, was the revelation of the origin of the war news on the Russo-German front in Eastern Europe.

Despite the tons of printed material on the fortunes of the Red Army and its war with the Germans which appeared in the United States press between June, 1941 and May, 1945 very few people reading it knew that not a single reporter to the American or British papers was actually at the front the entire time. The frustration of some finally brought about the explosion at a reception in Moscow in October, 1944, for foreign journalists given by VOKS, the Soviet cultural relations bureau. The highlights were the bitter complaints over confinement in Moscow hotels and forced dependence on stories culled from the Communist newspapers,[50] further subjected to censorship prior to being filed to America and Britain, by Paul Winterton of the London *News Chronicle* and Alexander Kendrick of the Philadelphia *Inquirer*.[51] Kendrick, whom even the Stalinophile *New Republic* described as a "strongly pro-Russian correspondent,"[52] subsequently had himself recalled to America "in disgust at his failure to get any real news."[53] But the situation did not improve, apparently. "The Russians keep our reporters on ice in Moscow, won't let them go to the front," complained Frank Gervasi of *Collier's* in mid-February of the next year.[54] (There were few reporters more kindly toward the Soviet than

---

[50] The ironic report by *Newsweek's* Moscow correspondent, Bill Downs, titled "The Orel Sweepstakes," documented this situation fourteen months before the famous blowup in Moscow. Downs' account (August 2, 1943, pp. 82, 85), concerned the "correspondents covering the Battle of the Orel Bulge from the Metropole Hotel and the [Soviet] Foreign Office Press department." He described with some humor the frantic scurrying through maps and timetables by those who had "risen early to collect their *Red Stars*, *Izvestias* and *Pravdas*," and the using of these to piece out where the latest Russo-German battle was going on. The result: eight different accounts by eight correspondents to US papers. Downs admitted that "no one" knew where the battle was going on except the combatants. Three weeks later (August 23, 1943, p. 28) *Newsweek* declared, "The Russians seldom allow correspondents-or any other foreigners-near the front lines." It was an introduction to Downs' latest story, which his editors claimed was "one of the first to be published on the present fighting in the Soviet." But a study of the three column story revealed that he got no closer than 25 miles to the front lines.

[51] *Time* (October 16, 1944), p. 73.

[52] "Poland, Russia and America," *New Republic* (January 8, 1945), p. 36.

[53] *Time* (October 30, 1944), p. 64. The *Time* story identified Kendrick as of Georgian (Caucasus) birth, also the birthplace of Stalin.

[54] Gervasi, "Russia vs. Britain in the Mediterranean," *Colliers'* (February 17, 1945), p. 19.

Gervasi.) Nor did things clear up as the Red Army burst across Poland and into Germany two months after Gervasi's cry. Said Eric Sevareid in the *Nation* on April 14, 1945, "Up to the present there has been no indication that the Russians intend to allow free journalists to work in Poland."[55]

Such lapses were uncommon, since the usual presentation of the situation ascribed military secrecy and security policies as being responsible for the censorship; only on such rare occasions was it learned that it was Stalinist policy to keep the newspapermen of their loudly-hailed "Allies" confined to the Hotel Metropole, digesting the current Soviet press on a daily basis in order to have anything to send home. And when such reports did leak out, they were usually buried deep in the back pages of the journals that bothered to report it.

On the whole, however, the American journalists in Moscow did not let confinement to the local area affect the ardent or imaginative quality of their prose. Russian-born Markoosha Fischer, wife of Louis Fischer, longtime Moscow correspondent to the *Nation* who became disillusioned about Stalinism a short time before America became a belligerent, got around to appraising their output in a sobered article in *Common Sense* in December 1945, which was given additional publicity by chastened *Time*. It was her conclusion that "much of the wartime writing of the U. S. correspondents in Moscow" during the 1941-45 war time "might have been signed by a *Daily Worker* editor."[56] Her ungentle admission that the American public had been deluged with a solid stream of Communist propaganda about Russia by essentially non-Stalinist writers was tempered by the claim that they had been intimidated from writing critiques of Stalinism for fear of being smeared in the United States.

By this time even the correspondents themselves had screwed up their courage. A letter incorporating a formal complaint by the Anglo-American Correspondents' Association was filed with the Soviet authorities, bitterly resentful over their persistence in maintaining "strict wartime censorship of news written by foreign correspondents."[57] The letter was reputedly written by Bruce Atkinson of the New York *Times* and signed by all the members, even Anna Louise Strong, whose pedigree as an uncritical adulator of things Stalinist was surpassed by no one.

---

[55] Sevareid. "Censors in the Saddle," *Nation* (April 14, 1945), pp. 415-16.
[56] "Those Moscow Correspondents," *Time* (December 17, 1945), pp. 61-62.
[57] "Letter to the Russians," *Time* (November 12, 1945), pp. 68-69.

The puzzling aspect of this episode revolved around whether there had been any official involvement or not. After all, it had been characteristic of the friends of Stalin in the American press to boast of the superior security of the Soviet to that of all other regimes and to commend them for their swiftness in annihilating their internal enemies, as in the case of the 1936-38 Moscow purge trials. One could not miss the tone of quiet pride in the *Time* story "Russia Will Hold Out," published three months after the outbreak of Russo-German hostilities in June 1941, over the tight grip on information in the Workers' Fatherland: "Any news out of Russia is what the Russians want the world to know. Their censorship makes the German censors look like children playing with paper dolls."[58] Russian policy had not changed at all. But the journalists who once admired and praised this policy and submitted to it the entire war with very little complaint had effected a surprising about-face.

There were many other considerations involved in this belated demonstration of valor than just whole-souled concern for access to "news" and freedom of expression, undoubtedly. The dark clouds of the Cold War were already rolling in over the countryside, and a new stance and working vantage point obviously was called for, as the era of official intimacy with Stalinism began drawing to an end. The time was at hand to start accumulating "anti-Communist" dossiers, undoubtedly, now that bawling uncritical acclaim no longer needed to be considered an essential credential. An amazing time was just about to close out.

The printed record does not support the charge made by both nationalist-patriot liberals and conservatives after 1945 that a "Communist menace" to the United States grew out of a conspiracy of American and Soviet Communists in America.[59] The steady and generous feeding of pro-Red propaganda in the country throughout the Second World War was preponderantly the work of multi-million circulation newspapers and magazines, the efforts of the multi-billion dollar radio and moving picture industries, supported by the effectiveness of the largest and most prosperous book publishers in blanketing the country with profuse literary tributes to Stalinist, Maoist and Titoist Communism, often signed by millionaires and well-paid representatives of the non-Communist mass media of all descriptions. The country's threadbare Communist *apparat* beamed in approval, of course, and responded to these steady, frequent, unbelievable windfalls with loud choruses of approbation, but the solid mass of pro-Communist sentiment which became a large factor in American opinion on world politics and economics was prepared and swallowed with modest assistance from direct Communist agencies and institutions.

---

[58] "Russia Will Hold Out," *Time* (October 27, 1941), p. 13.
[59] The postwar alarm over Soviet agents in the nation's capital during the war years did not extend to the presence of large numbers of nationals of other countries also there, working for their particular interests. It was *Newsweek* (July 7, 1941, p. 13), which observed in the early summer of 1941 that there were "more British in Washington than captured and burned it in 1814." The first inkling as to the real scope of British interference in American affairs long before the USA became England's war partner really did not come until the publication of H. Montgomery Hyde's book *The Quiet Canadian* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962), which detailed the activities of the British intelligence center in New York under the direction of the "quiet Canadian," Sir William Stephenson. Hyde's book was published in the U.S. under the title *Room 3603* (New York: Farrar and Straus, 1963).

In actuality, during the decade of the 1940s the CPUSA and all its publication adjuncts might just as well have gone out of business entirely, because their total contribution to the creation of the mountainous pro-Communist bank account of good will in the Western Hemisphere is barely perceptible, despite their usefulness in aiding the understanding of wartime Communist policies. The bawls of praise directed to various aspects of global Communism during this time from American and English heads of state, industrial, financial and commercial leaders, aristocratic diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic, and by opulent figures in the newspaper, magazine, book-publishing, radio and moving picture enterprises, collectively dwarf the efforts of formal Communist participation and render them relatively insignificant.

If there is one thing which can be established with little difficulty it is the self-doping of the capitalist English-speaking world with massive and profound delusions concerning European and Asian Communist aspirations and realities. In view of the obliterating avalanche of pro-Communist propaganda of all kinds which buried the United States during the Second World War, the amazing thing is that any kind of resistance to it maintained itself during this same time, and that it managed to get on the record and constitute a minority opposition with a respectable degree of achievement, even though a vast number remained suspicious but inarticulate. And when it became respectable and subsequently imperative to reverse the wartime stand and to act as if the Communist triumphs in the war were an utterly unanticipated disaster, it was just as revealing to notice who performed the pirouette soonest and with greatest éclat and effectiveness.

It has been related that the boast of V.M. Molotov for many years has been that the genius of Stalin in large-scale statecraft was his success in precipitating a civil war among the capitalist countries.[60] No participant in this civil war took part with more zest than the United States, nor worked harder to convince itself that its fortuitous partnership with Stalinist Russia was the opening bar of an overture to an endless era of peace, joy and profound international good will and understanding. [See Robert Edson Lee, *To The War* (New York: Knopf, 1968) a very brief but probably unexcelled memoir representative of the overwhelmingly preponderant majority of Americans for whom World War II was an incredibly rich and exciting experience and one which they have never begun to forget.]

The years of generalized promotion, by every device of mass communication, of "hands across the Volga" were hardly intended to provide just an accompanying sentimental obbligato to a short range tactical collaboration for the achievement of an incidental military triumph. The degree of profound and favorable conviction in the majority of pro-Stalinist testimonials prepared in America and Britain is transparent. It is this aspect that made it so hard to reject, so difficult for its fabricators to acknowledge as false and self-deceptive. Though many former adulators somersaulted with celerity to a hostile position toward Stalinism between 1945 and 1947, the depth of the convictions of the wartime era helps to account for the unwillingness of many others to accept the Cold War. From the point of view of the latter, there was no reason for it. The Stalinist regime had done nothing different or hostile or changed its policies or stance in any way; it was their late capitalist allies who had altered their perspective and in this sense the persistent anti-Cold Warriors, Stalinophile or otherwise, were correct. It really involved a rejection of the war, and a repudiation of everything for which the war was fought, to perform the about face called for by Churchill in his March, 1946 Fulton, Missouri speech, by the Truman Doctrine of March, 1947, by the program outlined by Secretary of State George C. Marshall in his Harvard address of June, 1947 and by George Kennan's "Containment" doctrine in his famous pseudonymously written position paper for *Foreign Affairs* in the same summer.[61] It is little wonder the Cold War made no sense then or since to these self-powered persons, and they have enjoyed a sense of semi-satisfaction in observing the discomfiture of those who persisted in relishing the war to the hilt, while indulging in subsequent schizoid laments over its political consequences.

---

[60] One of Molotov's more polite ways of phrasing the matter is the following: "Thanks to the Stalinist foreign policy, the Soviet Union was able to prevent the creation of a united front of capitalist states against the U.S.S.R. in the period preceding the second World War." Quoted in New York *Times*, international edition (June 24, 1956), p. 5.

[61] Probably the closest Mr. Truman has come to admitting the bankruptcy of all this complicated global policy was at the dedication of the Harry S. Truman Center for the Advancement of Peace in Independence, Missouri in mid-

But American and to some extent English supporters and opponents of the Cold War shared one thing in common, the stupendous wartime partnership when both repeatedly attained prodigious heights of eloquence in behalf of the internal and foreign politics of Stalinist Russia. This gratuitous contribution to the welfare of a foreign state had no parallel whatever in that war, and for that matter is quite unique in the history of warfare involving coalitions of disparate states. And only a tiny sliver of the whole emanated from the formal organs of the Communist Party. It is unmatched as an adventure in mass-conditioning of this magnitude; its effects are still being felt and seen.

January, 1966. A report of his speech, read in part by David Noyes, as summarized in the *National Observer* (January 24, 1966, p. 2):

"First, Mr. Truman said, it seemed that the steps he had taken as President toward peace appeared 'to have been in vain.'

Then he observed: 'Memories are short, and appetites for power and glory are insatiable. Old tyrants depart. New ones take their places. Old differences are composed, new differences arise. Old allies become the foe. The recent enemy becomes the friend. It is all very baffling and trying.'

Still, he said, 'We cannot lose hope, we cannot despair. For it is all too obvious that if we do not abolish war on this earth, then surely, one day, war will abolish us from the earth'."

REVISIONIST VIEWPOINTS

Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition

JAMES J. MARTIN

REVISIONIST VIEWPOINTS

Essays in a Dissident Historical Tradition

JAMES J. MARTIN

RALPH MYLES PUBLISHER, INC.
COLORADO SPRINGS
1971

Previously unpublished material
copyright, 1971, by Ralph Myles Publisher, Inc.

Second printing, March, 1977 in cooperation with and under the sponsorship of the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, California 94025.

International Standard Book Number: 0-87926-008-4

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 75-187779

Manufactured in the United States of America
Ralph Myles Publisher, Inc.
Box 1533
Colorado Springs, Colorado 80901

Contents

Preface v

Chapter **Page**

I On the "Defense" Origins of the New Imperialism 1
II A Look at Conscription, Then and Now 28
III The Unresolved Question of Fascism 53
IV The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Questions—in 1944 71
V The Return of the "War Crimes"—"War Criminals" Issue 125
VI American Mass Media and Stalinism, 1941-1947 141
VII Revisionism and the Cold War, 1946-1966 175

Appendix

I J. M. Keynes's Famous Foreword to the 1936 German Edition of the *General Theory* 197
II Meditations Upon the Early Wisdom of John Foster Dulles 206
III History and Social Intelligence 221